

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

MEMORANDUM

10 January 1949

TO : Acting ADSO

FROM : TRS

SUBJECT: CIA Organization and Functions

1. The recent CIA Organization Charts, dated 1 January 1949, contain only one statement that may have a direct bearing on the future of OSO Training. On page 6, under the functions of the Personnel Officer, item no. 4 reads:

Provides training and indoctrination for CIA employees as needed.

2. If this statement is broadly interpreted, the Personnel Officer, CIA, would have authority to assume jurisdiction over all or part of the training now conducted by OSO Training. This move could be made to appear most logical, particularly since OSO has the only training or indoctrination program in CIA run by a reasonably well-manned and efficient staff. Furthermore, OPC is now faced with the problem of building up a Training Staff from nothing to a staff orally predicted to become larger and more complex than OSS Schools and Training. Since OSO Training is in a very real sense the custodian of OSS training materials and know-how, OPC must, for some time to come, lean on OSO Training, not only for basic indoctrination in the techniques of clandestine operations but also for training in the specific techniques applicable to OPC activities.

3. My guess is that the OSO-OPC training needs will be at least ninety-five per cent of CIA's total training and indoctrination requirements. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that if OSO and OPC can work out a mutually agreeable training program, the Director would not favor a shift of OSO-OPC training responsibilities to the Personnel Officer, CIA. A proposal for a joint OSO-OPC approach to this problem is outlined below.

4. Before presenting a proposal for OSO-OPC training, I should like to comment on the relationship between Personnel and Training in an intelligence agency. In the typical U. S. Government agency, "training" is considered a function of the Personnel office. This training, at the most, consists of a short orientation course which covers the essential facts concerning the organization and functions of the agency.

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

This is followed by on-the-job training, generally supervised by the Personnel Officer. An intelligence agency needs orientation courses for all its employees, particularly in order to cover the security aspects of the work. (Except for brief security talks, this is not now being done for all of CIA.) However, the operating units of an intelligence agency require intensive and extensive training in objectives and techniques--both for offensive and defensive purposes. This training can be done best by men with field experience who understand the broad principles that underlie secret intelligence work. Training, therefore, by its very nature belongs in a close relationship to Plans and Operations, not to Personnel or Administration. The relevant comparison, organizationally speaking, is thus to the Armed Services' approach to training, not to the typical government bureau's.

25X1

Another point in connection with the relationship between Training and Personnel in an intelligence agency should be made. Personnel will look "good" or "bad" in direct proportion to the effectiveness of its recruiting and placement actions. Training, at least as we see it in OSO Training, has a real responsibility to evaluate students and to recommend proper placement. Our evaluations must set a high standard and must be independent judgments. If placed under Personnel, Training would inevitably be under pressure to soften its judgments.

25X1

5. The above paragraph may simply be flogging a dead--or non-existent--horse. However, whether or not an effort is made to shift Training to CIA Personnel, the OSO-OPC training problem will remain until the extent to which OSO and OPC collaborate on training matters is determined. The proposal that follows is simply a rough outline. If it meets with your approval and the Director's, I would be glad to work out the details.

6. Proposal for OSO-OPC Training:

a. The Director, CIA, would delegate the responsibility for all CIA training to the ADSO.

(Note 1: Security indoctrination could remain the function of the Chief, Inspection and Security. Similarly, the Personnel Officer, CIA, could be given the responsibility for indoctrination of

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

assumed by OSO if given administrative support by CIA Personnel.)

(Note 2: A precedence for this can be found in the present CIA Organization. OSO "provides world-wide communication security and support for all of CIA....")

b. Under the ADSO's direction, the Chief, TRS, would organize his staff along these lines:

(1) An Executive Officer, responsible for administration of training facilities and areas, budgets, records, and other necessary administrative support, administrative training, language training, and liaison with other agencies on training matters.

(2) A Deputy for Intelligence Training. (Primarily for OSO.)

(3) A Deputy for Operations Training. (Primarily for OPC.)

(4) A Deputy for Covert Training. (For both OSO and OPC, though security of both would be carefully guarded.)

c. In order to have adequate direction from both OPC and OSO, the Chief, TRS, would be advised on training requirements, objectives, and plans affecting training by a committee comprised of the chief planning officers of OSO and OPC and by one other representative from each Office to be appointed by the ADSO and the ADPC. These members, preferably, would represent the operations staffs of each Office. (If the over-all CIA indoctrination responsibility is added, the Director, CIA, should also appoint a member to this advisory committee.)

d. In addition to the above committee, TRS would further be aided by Training Liaison Officers appointed from the various components of OSO and OPC to handle liaison with TRS and to assist the Deputies responsible for Intelligence, Operations, and Covert Training in matters of concern to the component Branches and Staffs. (This system is now working most effectively within OSO.)

e. Budgetary and personnel allocations could be made by OSO and OPC, if necessary, on the basis of estimated training loads.

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

f. With the above organization and with adequate advice and support from OSO and OPC, TRS could present a pattern of training somewhat as follows:

(1) Administrative Training, both HQ and Field for those in OPC and OSO who need either or both types.

(2) Basic Orientation for all clerical and administrative personnel who are not directly concerned with operations.

(3) A Basic Course for OSO and OPC personnel who need to understand the basic principles of clandestine operations. This course would be a prerequisite to advanced training in OSO and OPC techniques and objectives.

(4) Advanced OSO Courses, similar to those now given, would be run under the direction of the Deputy for Intelligence Training. OPC students would be admitted to these courses by special permission and would not attend sessions of interest only to OSO.

(5) Advanced OPC Courses would be given under the direction of the Deputy for Operations Training. Since many different types of operations are envisaged for OPC, many separate schools will be required. However, since training in some of the OPC techniques will be needed by some OSO personnel, this training could be arranged, subject to security considerations as established by OPC.

(6) Covert Training will be needed by both OSO and OPC. Since this type of training requires the most secure handling of training sites, transportation, contacts, etc., as well as tailor-made programs for each student, it will be best to have all covert training supervised by one man who would have the right to call on instructors from Operations (OPC) Training and Intelligence (OSO) Training for assistance in specialized subjects.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

7. No elaborate justification for placing the CIA training function in OSO should be required; however, by way of summary, the following points should be recalled:

a. OSO has a continuity of experience behind it from OSS days to the present. This experience, on the training level particularly, includes propaganda, sabotage, weapons, guerrilla warfare, and maritime operations, as well as intelligence and counter-intelligence.

b. Unified control and direction of training will be more effective and certainly more economical. It is certainly more logical to build on an already effective training staff than to recruit and train another staff from scratch.

c. OPC, essentially an action office, will expand or contract as the cold war waxes hot or cools. Thus it would be preferable in calmer times to have only a skeleton training staff interested in direct action, but also to have possibilities for rapid expansion.

d. CIA should have only one point of liaison on training matters with outside agencies, including foreign intelligence services, for security reasons, if not simply for the sake of good administration.

e. In the event of war, CIA will require many and varied training establishments both in this country and overseas. If not under unified control and direction, CIA, within its own framework, will be competing for instructors, supplies, space, etc.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

f. In the present cold war, both OSO and OPC need forward-base training facilities to handle, usually in foreign languages, the training of non-American personnel for intelligence procurement and direct action. This type of training could best be handled under the direction of a single training staff in Headquarters and by a single training authority in the field.

g. The fact that OPC and OSO operational techniques have more in common than otherwise should be clearly recognized. True as this is in peace, it is more true in time of war. There is a further advantage in sharing common training, whatever the ultimate separation of operations may be, in that a mutual understanding of objectives and techniques will lead to smoother working relationships. Or, to put it another way--as we found it true in OSS--there is considerable advantage in wearing the same school tie.

8. In conclusion, I should like to point out that my proposals as outlined here are made in the sincere belief that OSO Training is capable of expanding sufficiently to handle OPC and OSO training needs. I also believe that this move would be in the best interests of CIA as a whole. If my proposals are presented to the Director, I should like him to understand that I am not seeking to improve my own position; on the contrary, I have repeatedly requested an overseas assignment and have been promised one as soon as I can be replaced. However, I do feel that, because we have not been self-promoting in OSO Training, our real potentialities and progress are not recognized outside OSO. We would welcome an opportunity to hold an open house soon and invite the Director and his chief staff officers to inspect our training facilities and to meet our instructors. If you feel that this is advisable, we would be most happy to plan such a program.

(Note: Three memoranda, recently prepared by me for COPS may be of relevance to this paper. They are:

25X1

3. A Program for the Training of OPC
Instructors by OSO/TRS

Copies of these were given to Mr. Angleton.)

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~